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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final judgment and
sentence of the Court below for a third degree felony crime,
possession of one ounce of marijuana.

Jurisdiction of this

Court is therefore conferred by Rule 26, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and Section 78-2a-3 (2) (e), Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended.
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I:

THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE

POINT II:

THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR
FELONY POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IS AN
UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DEFINITION OF A CRIME
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution

2.

Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution

3.

Section 58-3f-8(5)(a&b)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF

APPEALS

STATE OF U T A H ,

Respondent,

vs ,

LANE C.

STOMBERG,

Case No.

Appellant,

880618 CA

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The defendant was charged by way of Information with two
drug offenses and two offenses involving tax stamps.

After a jury

trial, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, to-wit: marijuana, a third degree felony.
Chief Gardner of the Syracuse Police Department met with
a fifteen year old female in connection with an investigation in
the beginning of April, 1988.

At that first meeting, there was

no mention made of any drugs. ( See reporter's transcript of
defendant's motion to suppress evidence, page 10, 12 and 14,
hereinafter referred to as Tr. Ms.)

The fifteen year old in-

formant, Tessie Heber, indicated to Chief Gardner in a subsequent interview that she had seen marijuana pipes in the home
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of the defendant (Tr. Ms. p. 18) and that she had seen the
defendant smoke marijuana three to four times, but that she
had never seen him smoking marijuana in the house. (Tr. Ms. p.
20)

The testimony was that she had seen the pipes in three

locations one and one half years previous to the interview.
( Tr. Ms. p. 27)

The last time that she had been in the

house, was the first week in March, 1988.

Further, she told

the officer that she had never seen drugs in the house. (Tr.
Ms. p. 25)
Chief Gardner put all of the information provided by
Ms. Heber into the affidavit for the search warrant. ( Tr. Ms.
p. 52)

Chief Gardner did not check the credibility of Ms.

Heber although he was aware that she was seeing a
psychiatrists for stress as well group therapy at school.
( Tr. Ms. p. 54-5)

Further, Ms. Heber had never experienced

marijuana, (Tr. Ms. p. 22) nor her ability to identify
marijuana pipes as opposed to other pipes.
Both Chief Gardner and Lon Brian, Davis County
Sheriff, Metro -Narc Task Force, felt that the information
from Ms. Heber was not sufficient to justify a search
warrant.( Tr. Ms. p. 30 and 89)

Further, the statements

attributed to Brian in paragraphs five and six of the
affidavit, ( Record p. 7) were made months prior to the
signing of the affidavit and issuance of the warrant.
(Tr. Ms. p. 122)
Further surveillance conducted on the defendant's
home ( see e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 34) just prior to the issuance of
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the warrant, cars belonging to certain known drug distributors
were seen parked near the defendant's home, although this
information as not presented to the magistrate. ( Tr. Ms. p
45.)

The timing and purpose for the search was a concern for

new drugs, ( Tr. Ms. p.46.) and to search for other drugs
while in the house, not just marijuana pipes. ( Tr. Ms. p 489.)
At the motion to suppress, Mr. Mark Andrus, Davis
County Attorney's Office, testified with regard to the
preparation and purpose of the search warrant and search.

In

connection with the preparation of the affidavit that they
intentionally took an expansive reading of the statements by
Ms. Heber to authorize a broader search.

As noted, controlled

substance was used, rather than just "marijuana", which was
what was told to the authorities by Ms. Heber. ( see e.g. Tr.
Ms. p. 77)

The purpose of the search warrant was to be able

to search for any controlled substances and any paraphernalia,
not just marijuana nor marijuana pipes, (see e.g. Record p.
85)

Further, the drugs that were being sought were not the

same drugs that had previously been there, but it was hoped
that new drugs would be available and ,on the premises, (see
e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 189.)

Further, Mr. Andrus knew that they did

not have information that the defendant was drug dealer, but
they hoped to be able to develop some information later and
get a second search warrant, which they attempted to do. (see
e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 187-8.)

It was therefore the basis and the

thrust of Mr. Andrus' testimony that although all that they
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had were evidence of marijuana pipes being on the premises,
that they wished an expansive search warrant to allow to
search for all sorts of drugs and paraphernalia and other
items in the belief that new drugs would be present to develop
a case against the defendant. ( See Mr. Andrus1 testimony p.17
Tr. Ms. p. 176-192.)

Further, it was Mr. Andrus1 hope that if

nothing else, the search and drugs would be leverage in a
separate sex case, if they were to find any. ( Tr. Ms. p.
184.)
Further, the search warrant attempted to authorize a
search for

"identification cards, records, accounts, etc.,"

although everyone knew that there was no evidence to justify
or base any reason for that search, other than to explore for
potential evidence. ( Tr. Ms. p. 60-61.)
Based upon the affidavit presented, a search warrant
was issued and a search was conducted of the defendant's home
on May 20, 1988.

The house was completely searched, as well

as separate garage, where other controlled substances were
allegedly found ( e.g. Tr. Ms. p. 127.)

Further, the searched

lasted for approximately ten hours.
After an extensive hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress held September 2, 1988, the District Court denied
defendant's motion to suppress. ( see Record p. 9)

At the

time of trial the evidence gathered from the search was
admitted into evidence, and defendant was convicted of third
degree felony, possession of a controlled substance, to-wit,
marijuana, in that the jury found that the defendant did

-4-

possess just over one ounce of marijuana within one thousand
feet of a public school.

However, there was no evidence that

there was anything other than possession in the defendant's
home, which abutted a school. (Transcript herein in re
certificate of probable cause p.4)

It was on that basis, that

there was merely simple possession near a school, as opposed
to involving use in proximity of a school, which was the basis
for issuing a certificate of probable case.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THAT EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE

The affidavit in support of the search warrant on
its face fails to demonstrate that there was probable cause
that a crime had been committed and that there would be
evidence of that crime in the defendant's residence.

In

addition, what evidence was in the affidavit was stale and of
no further efficacy.

In addition, the search warrant in issue

was over broad and pretextural in connection with seeking of
evidence of other crimes than that contained of in the
affidavit.
POINT II:

THAT A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT FOR
FELONY POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IS AN
UNREASONABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DEFINITION OF A CRIME

That defendant was convicted of possession of just
over one ounce of marijuana, an ordinary class "A"
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misdemeanor, however, based upon the possession occurring
within one thousand feet of a school, the offense was a third
degree felony.

Such is unreasonable, arbitrary and a denial

of the constitutional rights of a defendant.

Further, said

argument is further made because there was no evidence of any
connection between the controlled substance and a school.
ft TEGUMENT

POINT I:

THAT EVIDENCE OBTAIN PURSUANT TO THE
SEARCH WARRANT WAS IMPROPERLY ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE

The Utah Court of Appeals, in State vs. Miller. 740
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1987) discussed the requirements of issuing a
search warrant.

Illinois vs. Gates 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983),

the court stated, at page 1365: "
11

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
practical, commonsense decision, whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge1 of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place. And the duty of a
court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had
a substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that
probable cause existed."
The Utah Supreme Court in State vs. Hansen 732 P.2d
127 (Utah 1987) , further elaborated on the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant.

The court stated at page

130,
"Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in
a common-sense reasonable manner. .State v.
Williamson, 674 P.2d 132, 133 ( Utah 1983); State
v. Pursell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978). Excessive
technical dissection of an informant's tip or of
the nontechnical language in the officer's
affidavit is ill-suited to this task m i i no is v.
Gates) 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36, 103 S. Ct. at

2328-30, 2330-31, In Gates, the Supreme Court
emphasized that an informant's 'reliability' and
'basis of knowledge' are but two relevant
considerations, among others, in determining the
existence of probable cause under 'a totality-ofthe-circumstances.* 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36,
103 S. Ct. at 2328-30, 2330-31. They are not
strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly
exacted' in every case. A weakness in one or
other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in
the totality there is substantial basis to find
probable cause. Id. at 230, 238, 103 S. Ct. at
2328, 2332. The indicia of veracity, reliability,
and basis of knowledge are no exclusive elements
to be evaluated in reaching the practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances, there is a fair probability that
the contraband will be found in the place
described."
Although Gates adopted the totality of the
circumstances test, rejecting the Aauilar-Soinelli two prong
test, the two prong test may still need to followed.

As

stated in State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984), a case
decided after the rejection of the technical requirements of
Aquilar-Spinelli, at page 1205:
"However, even under this standard, compliance
with the Aguilar-Spinel1i guidelines may be
necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable
cause. Depending on the circumstances, a showing
of the basis of knowledge and veracity or
reliability of the person providing the
information for a warrant may well be necessary
to establish with a fair 'probability' that the
evidence sought actually exists and can be found
actually exists and can be found where the
informant states."
In the affidavit in the case at bar, there is no
indication that the defehdant was currently committing a
crime, or there would be evidence of that crime at his home.
The affidavit merely stated that the informant had seen the
defendant smoke marijuana three or four times in an unknown
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location and that she had see various marijuana pipes lying
around the house.

There is no where stated in there the basis

for that information and the source of that knowledge.
Further, although in paragraph four the affiant stated that
the girl was reliable, he was well aware of various
psychological and other problems of Ms. Heber, and in
addition, reasons for her to lie.( see Tr. Ms. at 54-57)
Further, there was no reason to believe that there was any
present likelihood of the same marijuana or the same pipes to
be present.

The claim in paragraphs five and six that people

who smoke marijuana generally have evidence of drugs around
their house, would clearly not be an appropriate factual basis
to support any search warrant.

Based upon that same argument,

a warrant would have been proper two years ago to the home of
Court of Appeals Judge Allen Ginsberg, based upon his having
smoked marijuana at party ten years before.

There is a

requirement that there be probable cause existing at that time
that a particular piece of contraband or evidence is present,
not the likelihood that it has not been disposed of over a
long period of time.
The related and flip side of this concern has* to do
with staleness, and the currency of the present information,
which is an essential to the determination of probable cause.
As stated in the United States vs. McCall, 740 F.2d 1333
(Fourth Circuit 1984) the Court stated at pages 1335-36:
"The Fourth Amendment bars search warrants
issued on less than probable cause, and
there is no question that time is a crucial
element of probable cause. A valid search
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warrant may issue only upon allegations of
'facts so closely related to the time of the
issue of the warrant as to justify a finding
of probable cause at that time. Whether
proof meets this test must be determined by
the circumstances of each case.' Consequently,
evidence seized pursuant to a warrants afforded
by 'stale' probable cause is not admissible
in a criminal trial to establish the
defendant's guilt.
Cases in which staleness becomes an issue arise
in two different context. First, the facts
alleged in the warrant may have been sufficient
to establish probable cause, when the warrant was
issued, but the government's delay in executing
the warrant possibly tainted the search. Second,
the warrant itself may be suspect because the
information upon which it rested was arguably to
old to furnish 'present' probable cause.
Reviewing the court's task in each category of
cases is slightly different. In testing a warrant
in the first category, it must decide whether a
valid warrant became invalid due a lapse of
time; when considering those in the second
category, it must determine whether information sufficient to constitute probable cause was
ever presented. The court's fundamental
concern, however, is always the same: Did
the facts alleged in the warrant furnish probable
cause to believe, at the time the search was
actually conducted, that evidence of criminal
activity was located at the premises search?"
(citations omitted)
The evidence presented in the affidavit is clearly
stale.

The most that can be said from the affidavit is that

in a period one and one half years prior to the affidavit,
that the defendant had been seen smoking marijuana three or
four times.

Further, the confidential informant had seen

marijuana pipes in the defendant's house on a number of
occasions, the exact number not known, although the last was
at least two and one half months prior to the warrant.

Thus,

unless the Court excepts the proposition that once an
individual has marijuana pipes in his home, that it would give
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probable cause to believe that those same marijuana pipes
would be present at any time, the information was too stale in
this case to support the search.
It is also clear that the search warrant in this
case was pretextural and the purpose was not as set forth in
the affidavit.

As testified to by Mark Andrus, Davis County

Attorney, they were not seeking the same marijuana in the
house as had supposedly been seen. (Tr. Ms. p. 189.)

Further,

they were seeking evidence of other drugs and other crimes
rather than merely the marijuana or the marijuana pipes. ( Tr.
Ms. p.175-183, Chief Gardner's testimony Tr. Ms. p. 46.)
Further, the search warrant sought to authorize a search for "
identification cards, records, accounts, books, pictures,
receipts, etc.," notwithstanding the fact that there was no
probable cause or basis to believe that would be there based
upon the statements of the confidential informant that there
were marijuana pipes seen at the house.

Therefore, it is

clear that the search warrant was pretextural, the intended
purpose of the search was for something other than that
contained in the affidavit and search warrant.

Further, the

officers and the county attorney knew that they did not have
sufficient basis for the other matters, but used the search
warrant to search for other items.

( see testimony of Lon

Brian, Davis County Sheriff, Tr. Ms. at 89 and 110-112, Chief
Gardner

Tr. Ms. at p. 30, 46, 48-49, County Attorney, Andrus

Tr. Ms. P. 175-84.)

Therefore, said evidence was not properly

seized pursuant to the search warrant, but went "beyond it.
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Therefore, since there was no probable cause in the
search warrant, since any evidence and information was stale
the Court should find that the evidence was improperly seized.
In addition, based upon the pretextural nature of the search
the overbreadth of the warrant, the lack of probable cause for
the particulars of it, this Court should similarly rule that
the search warrant was improper and invalid, and disallow any
evidenced seized pursuant to it.
POINT II:

THAT A CONVICTION OF THE DEFENDANT
FOR FELONY POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
IS AN UNREASONABLE AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEFINITION OF A
CRIME

Defendant was convicted of a third degree felony
possession of marijuana because he was within the provision of
the enhancement portion of the Controlled Substances Act,
requiring that if possession is within one thousand feet of
any school, it shall be third degree felony.

It is submitted

that without more, this violates the defendant's due process
rights, especially in absence of evidence that there was any
nexus or relationship between the possession of the marijuana
and being within one thousand feet of a school.
As stated in Cardar^lla vs City of Overland Park 620
P.2d 1120 ( Kansas 1980), at page 1127:
"A guarantee of due process demands only that
the statute shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to
the objective sought to be obtained. Nebbia v.
New York 291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed
940 ( 1934.)
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The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that arbitrary
classification of crimes may be unconstitutional. See e.g.
State v. Clark 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981) at 843.
It is submitted that it is arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable to elevate a class "A" misdemeanor possession of
marijuana to a third degree felony merely because it is in
within one thousand feet of a school without more.

If the

statute were to require or if the evidence herein showed that
there was some relationship between the possession and the
school- such as a sharing with the young students of that
school or attempted sales or anything else, there may be a
reason.

But merely based upon the fortuitous fact that the

defendant's home was within one thousand feet of school does
not present a rationale basis to elevate this crime to a
felony.

There is no reason to elevate the crime in the

absence of some further nexus or connection.

Physical

location is not sufficient.
It also raises great concerns with regard to
unreasonable and unbridled discretion of the prosecutor to
charge.

If you have a situation where an individual possessed

some marijuana in a car, if he travels within one thousand
feet of a school, it could be a felony, although the
prosecutor would not charge it as a felony.

Further, it may

be difficult are in various parts of the State of Utah

to

find places that greater than one thousand feet of school

so

that an intelligent criminal could merely be guilty of a
misdemeanor, as opposed to a felony.
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However, the discretion

is too great, the basis for the elevation to tenuous to
sustain or justify and it is improper to grant so much
discretion to a prosecutor in the choice of the charge.
See e.g. State vs. Bryant 709 P2d 257 (Utah 1985)

Therefore,

there is no rational basis for the elevation of the alleged
misdemeanor to a felony in the particulars of this case, nor
on the face of the statute.

Thus, the classification if

arbitrary, capricious and lacking in rational basis, and
cannot be sustained.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence
obtained pursuant to the search warrant in the present case
was improperly admitted into evidence, upon the basis that
there was no probable cause for the issuance of the warrant,
that the warrant was over broad on its face and as applied,
based upon stale information and pretextural in nature of its
execution.

Therefore, this Court should reverse the admission

of that evidence and remand the matter for a new trial.
Further, the conviction of the defendant for a felony
constitutes a denial of his constitutional rights to due
process of law, in that the exacerbation of the statute from a
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misdemeanor to a felony is arbitrary, capricious and
unreasonable.

Therefore, in reversing and remanding, this

Court should direct that in absence of further nexus between
the school and the possession, a felony conviction cannot be
obtained.
DATED this

dayof

, 1989

THOM D. ROBERTS
Attorney for Defendant/
Appellant
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